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Has Georgia Gone Too Far-or Will Sex
Offenders Have To?
by JACQUELINE CANLAS-LAFLAM*
There is no shortage of seemingly ordinary people who have been
forced to register as sex offenders in the State of Georgia. Ms. Whitaker is
a twenty-six-year-old college student studying criminal justice and has
been married for six years.' At age seventeen, she had consensual oral sex
with a fifteen-year-old male.2 She was convicted of sodomy and served
five years of probation.3 As a result of her conviction, she had to register
as a sex offender. 4 Ms. Allison, a mother of five, was convicted as a party
to statutory rape when her daughter became pregnant at the age of fifteen
and she later allowed the boy who impregnated her daughter to move into
their house.5 Ms. Allison was sentenced to fifteen years of probation and is
included on the Georgia sex offender registry. 6 Mr. Wilson is a twentythree-year-old college student at Georgia State University.7 When he was a
freshman in college, he pled guilty to a sexual offense for "inappropriately
touching an adult female college friend while highly intoxicated at a
freshman party." 8 He was sentenced to five years of probation. 9 He is
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their never ending support in law school and in life. I am especially grateful to Ned Arens for his
inspiration and support, and to Spiros Fousekis and Richie Aranda for their feedback on my note
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1. Complaint at 7, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-cv-140 (N.D. Ga. filed June 20, 2006)
[hereinafter Complaint].
2. Id.
3. Id.

4. Id.
5.

Id. at 10.

6. Id.
7. Id.at 11.
8. Id.

9. Id.
[309]
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registered as a "level I" sex offender, "the lowest possible designation [in
Georgia], reflecting the unlikeliest possibility of re-offending." 10
There are few criminals in our society that receive more contempt and
deserve less sympathy than convicted sex offenders. Lawmakers hesitate
to question the strictness of statutes aimed at sex offenders because
"lawmakers who change the rules could be called 'soft on crime." ' " It is
not surprising that across political party lines, there is no strong interest in
protecting the Constitutional rights of convicted sex offenders. Because
state legislatures may not represent the interests of sex offenders fairly,
and, in order to maintain the integrity of our legal system, it is important to
consider the legality of statutes aimed at sex offenders, no matter how
unpopular it may be.
Statutes aimed at sex offenders often require registrants to register
personal information or place restrictions on where they may live. A
number of states have enacted mandatory residency registration statutes
that divulge the identities and addresses of convicted sex offenders. 2
States have also enacted laws, such as Florida's Jessica Lunsford Act, to set
minimum sentencing for sex offenders and provide for lifetime electronic
monitoring for certain types of offenders.13 In November of 2006, for
example, California passed an initiative requiring certain registered sex
offenders to be monitored by global positioning systems for life. 14 In the
last ten years, twenty-seven states and many cities have passed residency
restrictions, limiting where a convicted sex offender may live within the
state.' 5 In some situations, the statutes have barred registered sex offenders
from large parts of the cities, if not made it nearly impossible for them to
find anywhere to live legally in the state.' 6 The general purpose of these
residency restrictions is to protect the health and safety of the public,' 7
specifically the children.' 8
10. Id.at 12.
11. Wendy Koch, Sex-offender Residency Laws Get Second Look, USA TODAY, Feb. 25,
2007, at A l, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-02-25-sex-offender-lawscoverx.htm.
12. Bret R. Hobson, Note, Banishing Acts: How FarMay States Go to Keep Convicted Sex
Offenders Away From Children?,40 GA. L. REv. 961, 963 (2006) (discussing the present state of
statutes aimed at convicted sex offenders).
13. Id. at 963-64.
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004(b) (Deering 2007).
15. Koch, supra note 11.
16. Id.
17. See 2006 Ga. Laws 379, § I ("The General Assembly finds and declares that recidivist
sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use physical violence, and sexual offenders who prey on
children are sexual predators who present an extreme threat to the public safety.... The General
Assembly further finds that the high level of threat that a sexual predator presents to the public
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Currently, at least twenty-seven states have enacted residency
restriction laws.1 9 The statutes generally state that a sex offender cannot
live within some specified distance of a school or childcare center. This

distance is most frequently either within one thousand or two thousand
feet.20 For instance, as of November 2006, California prohibits registered
sex offenders from living within two thousand feet of "any public or
private school, or park where children regularly gather., 21 However, some
states have made their statutes even stricter by lengthening this distance,
adding more prohibited locations to the enumerated list, or placing
restrictions on other activities such as employment.22 A few statutes allow

for some type of individualized assessment of dangerousness.2
Thus far, statutes in states such as Iowa 24 and Georgia 25 have come

under fire in the federal courts for an assortment of alleged constitutional
violations.

The circuit courts have not invalidated such statutes.26

Residency restriction statutes have sustained constitutional challenges in
federal court that they are:
[O]verbroad and vague; permit[ting] a regulatory taking without just
compensation; interfer[ing] with the right to contract; constitut[ing] a
bill of attainder; and violat[ing] substantive due process, procedural
due process, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination, the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and

safety, and the long-term effects suffered by victims of sex offenses, provide the state with
sufficient justification to implement... [our] strategy.").
18. Hobson, supra note 12, at 965.
19. Koch, supra note 11 (table titled "State restrictions" summarizes sex offender statutes in
several states). The following states have residency restrictions: Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. Id.
20. Id.
21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5(b) (Deering 2007). Note also that in California, "[e]very
inmate who has been convicted for any felony violation of a 'registerable sex offense' ... or any
attempt... and who is committed to prison and released on parole ... shall be monitored by a
global positioning system for life." CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004(b) (Deering 2007) (emphasis
added).
22. Id.
23. Id. See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128 (2006) (residency restriction in Arkansas
allowing for a particularized risk assessment for sex offenders).
24. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005). See also IOWA CODE § 692A.2A (2005).
25. Doe v. Baker, No. l:05-CV-2265-TWT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67925 (N.D. Ga. April
5, 2006). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-13 (2006).
26.

See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d at 704-05; Baker, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67925, at *26-27.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 35:2

unusual
punishment, and the right to equal protection under the
27
law.
The Supreme Court has yet to review any of these residency restrictions
statutes.28 The Court has, however, upheld the validity of registrationnotification statutes.29
In June of 2003, Georgia passed a statute prohibiting registered sex
offenders from living within one thousand feet of schools, childcare
facilities, or "where minors congregate. 30 A registered sex offender
challenged the statute in federal district court as violating the Ex Post Facto
Clause, the Eighth Amendment, Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, and the
Fourteenth Amendment under due process and the right to privacy. 3'
The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia upheld the
statute as constitutional. 2 First, the court rejected the plaintiffs claim that
the statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by subjecting him to
additional punishment, reasoning that Congress enacted the statute with a
clear regulatory intent and that any punitive effects of the statute did not
violate the clause.33 Further, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the
statute was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.3 4
Because the statute was not punishment, there could be no Eighth
Amendment violation.35 The court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss the Procedural Due Process claim without addressing the merits of
the claim because the plaintiff failed to respond to the defendants'
motion.36 The court rejected the Substantive Due Process claim that the
statute impeded on his right of privacy and right for his extended family to
live together.37 The plaintiff claimed that his family would be forced to
decide whether to move with him or live without him.38 The court declined
to recognize a new liberty interest particularly where the statute did not

27. Hobson, supra note 12, at 970-72 (citations omitted). But note the recent Georgia
Supreme Court decision invalidating Georgia's residency restriction living provision under a state
and federal Takings Clause analysis. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
28. Hobson, supra note 12, at 969.
29. Id. See also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
30. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-13 (2006).
31. Baker, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67925, at *3.
32. Id. at *27.
33. Id. at *17-*18.
34. Id. at *18.
35. Id.
36. Id. at*18-*19.
37. Id. at*21.
38. Id.
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dictate who he lived with, but rather where he lived. 39 Lastly, the plaintiff
claimed that the regulation denied him all economic or productive use of
his land without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause. 40 The court rejected this argument, finding that the
regulation did little to affect his economic interest or investment-backed
expectations in his land.41
In 2006, Georgia passed an even harsher statute 42 that was
considered, at the time, to be the strictest sex offender statute in the
country.43 The new statute prohibited registered sex offenders from
residing, 44 working, 45 or loitering 46 within one thousand feet of "any child
care facility, church, school, or area where minors congregate., 47 A
violation of the statute is a felony and the punishment for a violation is a
minimum of ten to a maximum of thirty years in prison. 48 The statute
explains that "the term '[a]rea where minors congregate' shall include all
public and private parks and recreation facilities, playgrounds, skating
rinks, neighborhood centers, gymnasiums, school bus stops, and public and
community swimming pools. ' 49 Two noteworthy aspects of this law are
that it applies to school bus stops, which are unmarked and scattered in
suburban areas, 50 and that the statute applies to everyone on the registry
without exception for illness, age, financial hardship, or disability.5'
Georgia has in excess of 10,000 sex offenders and 150,000 school bus

39. Id. at *21-23.
40. Id. at *23.
41. Id. at *24-*26.
42. Complaint, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining that the statute was to go into effect on July 1,
2006).
43. Jenny Jarvie, Georgia Sex-offender Rules Create Stir, SEATTLE TIMES, July 3, 2006, at
.A5, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003101190_offender03.html.
44. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a) (2006). Note that this statute has been invalidated in part.
See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
45. § 42-1-15(b). This provision prohibits sex offenders from being "employed by any child
care facility, school, or church or by any business or entity that is located within 1,000 feet of a
child care facility, a school, or a church."§ 42-1-15(b)(1). Further, "sexually dangerous
predator[s]"are prohibited from "be[ing] employed by any business or entity that is located within
1,000 feet of an area where minors congregate." § 42-1-15(b)(2).
46. § 42-1-15(a).
47. § 42-1-15(a), (b).
48. § 42-1-15(d).
49. § 42-1-12(a)(3).
50. Although it appears that there have been no studies on the subject, it is the experience of
the author that school bus stops are generally unmarked.
51.

Complaint, supra note I, at 26.
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stops. 52 Further, for purposes of the new statute, Georgia does not
distinguish between types or dangerousness of sexual offenders. 3
Teenagers who have consensual 5 4sexual relations with other minors are
treated the same as violent rapists.
In 2006, as a result of the previous Georgia sex offender statute, Ms.
Whitaker, the young woman who engaged in consensual oral sex as a
minor with another minor, had already been forced to move from the home
that she and her husband own and on which they still pay a mortgage.55
They found temporary housing, but realized they would probably be forced
to move if the school bus stop provision of the new statute was enforced.5 6
As a result, the Whitakers have endured financial strain and uncertainty as
to whether or not they will find housing, jobs, and if they will be able to
simultaneously live together
and make a living while remaining within the
57
constraints of the new law.
Ms. Allison, the mother who was convicted of being a party to the
crime of statutory rape when she allowed her underage daughter to become
pregnant, was told she was in violation of the new Georgia statute. 58 Two
weeks after the enactment of the law, a deputy from the county sheriffs
office came to her door and told her that her home was within one thousand
feet of a school bus stop. 59 She and her family have had difficulty finding a
home that they can afford that complies with the statute. 60 Even many
mobile home parks have been found to be off-limits as they are frequently
within one thousand feet of playgrounds, swimming pools, or school bus
stops. 61 Ms. Allison's court-ordered treatment provider has also warned
her that the new statute prohibits registered sex offenders from attending
church.62
Mr. Wilson, the young man who was convicted of inappropriately
touching an adult female friend from college, co-owns a home that is

52. Jarvie, supra note 43.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Complaint, supra note 1, at 7. Under the former Georgia residency restriction statute,
Ms.Whitaker's house was within one thousand feet of a church that operated a daycare within its
walls. Id.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 10.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 10-11.
61. Id. at 11.
62. Id.
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within one thousand feet of a school bus stop. 6 3 Furthermore, he works
within one thousand feet of a church.64 Enforcement of the new statute
would require him to find a new place to live and a new place to work.6 5
After six weeks of looking for a place to live that would comply with the
statute in the metro Atlanta area, he believed he found a motel in an
industrial area, but was uncertain as to whether he will ultimately end up in
violation of the school bus stop provision because the locations of the bus
stops were scheduled to change in the next six weeks.66
A class consisting of the registered sex offenders above and other sex
offenders challenged the statute, with a special focus on the bus stop
provision. 67 The plaintiffs argued that the statute is unconstitutional for
violating the following: the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Eighth Amendment
(by placing an unconstitutional punishment based on status), both
procedural and substantive due process, the Free Exercise Clause and the
right to freedom of association, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, and
the rights to interstate and intrastate travel.68 The plaintiffs also claimed
that the statute violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act.6 9
However, on November 21, 2007, before the case could be decided in
federal district court, the Georgia Supreme Court considered Mann v.
Georgia Department of Corrections, in which it invalidated the living
provision (§ 45-1-15(a)) of the latest Georgia residency restriction statute
on a Fifth Amendment Takings theory. 70 The Georgia Supreme Court said
that forcing sex offenders who are homeowners to leave their homes can be
tantamount to an unlawful taking under both the federal and state
constitutions. 7' Justice Hunstein explained that "there is no place in
Georgia where a registered sex offender can live without being continually
at risk of being ejected., 72 "[S]ex offenders face the possibility of being
repeatedly uprooted and forced to abandon [their] homes in order to

63. Id. at 11-12.
64. Id. at 12.
65. Complaint, supra note 1, at 12.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2, 32-34.
68. Id. at 32.
69. Id.
70. Mann v. Geor. Dep't of Corr., 2007 Ga. LEXIS 849, *14 (2007). This case was decided
as this note was going to press and the opinion is not final until expiration of the rehearing period.
71. Id. at*3, *8.
72. Id. at *3.
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comply with the [law's] restrictions . . . . ,,73 This is so because, unlike
states that provide a "grandfather" exception for offenders living near
childcare facilities that were established within the restricted zone after the
enactment of the statute, Georgia provides no such exception.7 4 Thus,
under the Georgia statute, sex offenders who have otherwise complied with
the provisions of the statute are forced to move whenever one decides to
open a school, church, or child care facility within the restricted zone.
Nonetheless, the federal case is still pending in district court and many
of the issues raised by those plaintiffs are still alive, including those
relating to the statute's other provisions. Further, by invalidating this
provision solely on a Takings Clause theory, it is still important to consider
the other constitutional issues raised by the plaintiffs. After all, it is likely
Georgia's legislature will simply seek to rewrite the statute to pass muster
under a Takings analysis. For instance, the opinion suggests that a
"grandfather" clause might cure the unconstitutionality of the statute. In
fact, Georgia House Majority Leader Jerry Keen intends on taking another
stab at the living provision in January.75 Even if this change is made, the
other constitutional challenges will still be relevant and should be taken
into consideration in rewriting the new provision. Keen hopes the state will
appeal Mann so that the Takings question can be ultimately be heard by the
United States Supreme Court.7 6 However, if these other constitutional
concerns are ignored by the legislature, then the courts will ultimately be
faced with such challenges and Keen may get his wish of Supreme Court
review.
Because Mann was decided on a Takings analysis alone, this note will
discuss alternative theories that state legislatures and courts should consider
in the context of sex offender residency restrictions. Specifically, Georgia
serves as a revealing case study of the constitutionality of restrictive
residency restrictions targeting sex offenders. Given the wide range of
issues that were presented by Georgia's latest sex offender residency
restriction, this note will discuss how Georgia's new residency restriction

73.

Id. at *5.

74. See infra notes 120, 114-130 and accompanying text.
75.

InsiderAdvantageGeorgia.com,

Jerry Keen: Supreme Court Ruling Last Week Makes

Nov.
26,
2007,
Sex
Offenders,
Haven
for
a
Safe
Georgia
http://www.insideradvantagegeorgia.com/restricted/2007/November/202007/11-26-07/Keen_
Safe_ Havenl 12619633.php. Keen says he is "looking at a new law that would re-establish the
residency requirement except for those who could prove they were in compliance with the law
when they initially moved to a new location, even if subsequent developments put them out of
compliance with the law." Id. It sounds as though the state legislature believes a grandfather
clause is enough to remedy the statute of its unconstitutional nature.
76. Id.
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statute, as originally written, violated (1) the Ex Post Facto Clause, (2) the
Eighth Amendment, (3) Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and (4) the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."
Lastly, the note will analyze potential issues under the Dormant Commerce
Clause and other policy considerations to argue that, in practice, the use of
such harsh residency restrictions might make for a more dangerous
situation for children, sex offenders, and the rest of society.
I. Background History of New Georgia Statute
As with most sex offender residency restriction statutes, one stated
purpose of the new Georgia statute is to protect the health and safety of
Georgia's citizens, 78 including protecting Georgia's children from sex
offenders. 79 However, there is another purpose. The chief sponsor of the
statute, House Majority Leader Jerry Keen, has made clear that the purpose
of the statute is to force registered sex offenders out of Georgia, stating:
We want people running away from Georgia. Given the toughest
laws here, we think a lot of people could move to another state ....
If it becomes too onerous and too inconvenient, they just may want
to live somewhere
else. And I don't care where, as long as it's not in
80
Georgia.
A class of registered sex offenders sued the Georgia Governor, State
Attorney General, and a Chief Probation Officer8 in district court, to
enjoin the State from enforcing the new law. 82 On June 26, 2006, the court
granted a temporary restraining order for certain individuals from
enforcement of the law,83 and three days later, the court granted a
temporary restraining order for the narrow class of those registered sex
offenders affected by the bus stop provision. 84 Whether or not the plaintiff

77. For a discussion on challenges not discussed in this note, see Chiraag Bains, NextGeneration Sex Offender Statutes: Constitutional Challenges to Residency, Work, and Loitering
Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483 (2007).
78. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
79. Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
80. Kaffie Sledge, 'Toughest' Isn't Justice, COLUMBUS LEDGER ENQUIRER, June 26, 2006,
available
at
http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/HB 1059_litigation/NewsArticles/
news hb 1059_columbus03.htn.
81. Complaint, supra note 1, at 20-21.
82. Id.
83. Greg Bluestein, Judge Blocks Bus-Stop Limits on Sex Offenders, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
June 29, 2006, available at http://onlineathens.com/stories/063006/news_20060630061 .shtml.
84. Id.
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class will succeed in court on the remaining alleged constitutional
violations is uncertain.
II. Ex Post Facto Clause
Residency restriction statutes have been challenged in courts for
allegedly violating the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 10,
Clause 1 of the Constitution.85 Thus far, these challenges have been
unsuccessful.86 However, dissents in these cases have been common.87
An ex post facto law is commonly defined as "a law that
impermissibly applies retroactively, especially in a way that negatively
affects a person's rights, as by criminalizing an action that was legal when
it was committed." 88 Thus, a law is ex post facto whenever the legislature
enacts a law that "imposes a greater punishment upon an individual than
the law previously attached at the time when the crime was committed. 89
In the context of residency restrictions, convicted sex offenders have
already been punished for the crimes for which they were convicted.9 °
Residency restrictions, if considered punishment, add additional
punishment for the sex offense after the crime was committed.
Furthermore, those people who legally lived in restricted areas before the
law was enacted suffer ex post facto punishment when living there is
criminalized without an exemption for them-they would be punished for
living somewhere that was not illegal at the time they decided to do so.
As of yet, no residency restriction statutes have been invalidated based
on a finding of punishment. 91 As discussed below, unlike the statutes in
Doe v. Miller,92 Doe v. Baker,93 and Smith v. Doe, 94 the new Georgia statute
as originally written closely resembles punishment and, therefore, would
not withstand the same constitutional challenges as the previously upheld
statutes.

85.

Hobson, supra note 12, at 980. See also U.S. CONST. art.

1, §

10, cl. 1.

86. Hobson, supra note 12, at 980.
87. Id. at 981.
88. Michael J. Duster, Note, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: State Attempts to Banish Sex
Offenders, 53 DRAKE L. REv. 711, 727 (2005) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 640 (8th ed.
2004)).
89. Id.
90. Duster, supra note 88, at 726-27.
91. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
92. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005). See also IOWA CODE § 692A.2A (2005).
93. Doe v. Baker, No. 1:05-CV-2265-TWT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67925 (N.D. Ga. April
5, 2006). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-13 (2006).
94. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). See also ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010 (2007).
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In Doe v. Miller, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a number of
constitutional challenges to an Iowa residency restriction statute.9 5 The
Iowa statute prohibited registered sex offenders from living within two
thousand feet of a school or registered childcare facility. 96 The statute did
not apply, however, to sex offenders who established their residence prior
to the law's enactment, or to schools and childcare facilities established
after its enactment.97 The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's
finding that the statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause (for those sex
offenders who committed the crime before the statute was enacted), the
right to avoid self-incrimination,98 and both procedural and substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.99
The plaintiffs in Miller argued that the statute was retroactive
punishment for sex offenders whose criminal conduct took place prior to
to
the enactment of the law. 00 The court looked to the test in Smith v.0 Doe
1
Clause.'
Facto
Post
Ex
the
violates
statute
state
a
whether
determine
In Smith, the Supreme Court reviewed the validity of the Alaskan Sex
Offender Registration Act of 1994 ("the Act").'0 2 This was the first time
the Supreme Court reviewed the validity of a sex offender registration
statute under the Ex Post Facto Clause. 0 3 The Act required that sex
offenders register with the state law enforcement agencies. 0 4 Opponents of
the Act claimed that the Act was punitive in nature and was therefore
retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 0 5 The
Court reasoned that if the purpose of the statute was to punish, then this
would be a violation of the clause, but if the statute were merely regulatory,
then the Court would need to "further examine whether the statutory
in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's]
scheme is 'so punitive either
06
civil.'
it
deem
to
intention'

95. Miller, 405 F.3d at 704-05.
96. Id. at 704.
97. Id. at 705.
98. Id. at 708, 716-18. The self-incrimination clause was arguably violated when convicted
sex offenders are required to report their address of residence even if not in compliance with the
residency restriction statute. Id. at 716.
99. Id. at 708.
100. Miller, 405 F.3d at 718.
101.
102.

Id.
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2003).

103.

Id. at 92.

104.
105.
106.

Id. at 89.
Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 92.
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The Court applied a test to determine that the Act was not punitive,
but instead was a civil regulatory statute, and therefore did not violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause. 0 7 The Smith test looks to: (1) whether the effect of
the sex offender statute was historically regarded as punishment; (2)
whether the statute promotes the traditional aims of punishment; (3)
whether the statute imposes an "affirmative disability or restraint;" and, (4)
whether the statute has a rational connection to a non-punitive10 8purpose, or
whether the restriction is excessive in relation to that purpose.
A.

The Georgia Residency Restriction Was Effectively a Form of
Punishment

In Miller, the plaintiffs argued that the Iowa residency restriction was
the practical equivalent to banishment, a form of punishment.10 9 The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied the Smith test, the test formulated
by the Supreme Court in regards to Alaskan sex offender registration
statute, to determine whether the statute was effectively punishment. 01
The first issue under the Smith test is whether the law has been
historically considered to be punishment.' 1 The Miller court conceded that
the Supreme Court considered banishment to be historically a form of
punishment in Smith.' 2 However, the court rejected the idea that Iowa's
statute was tantamount to banishment." 3 The court explained that:
[B]anishment ... involves an extreme form of residency restriction.
• . . Unlike Banishment, § 692A.2A restricts only where offenders
may reside. It does not "expel" the offenders from their communities
or prohibit them from accessing areas near schools or child care
facilities for employment, to conduct commercial transactions, or for
any purpose other than establishing a residence. With respect to
many offenders, the statute does not even require a change of
residence: the Iowa General Assembly included a grandfather
provision that permits sex offenders to maintain a residence that was
established prior ... [to its enactment]. "4
Further, the court pointed out that the Iowa statute included a "grandfather
provision" that exempted those sex offenders already living within the
107.
108.

Id. at 97.
Id.

109.

Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 719 (8th Cir. 2005).

110. Id.
111.

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003).

112. Miller, 405 F.3d at 719.
113. Id.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
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restricted areas from violation of the law if "[t]he person has established
residence prior to [the date of enactment] or a school or child care facility
is newly located on or after" the date of enactment. 15 Thus, there was no
threat of the statute violating the Ex Post Facto Clause for those who
established residency before the Iowa law was enacted.
Here, the new Georgia statute involves not merely a restriction on
residency, but also a restraint on where a registered sex offender may work
or loiter. 1 6 Currently there is no U.S. Supreme Court authority on sex
offender residency restriction statutes that prohibit where one may work
and loiter.1 7 The court in Miller did not find the Iowa statute was
effectively banishment because the statute only restricted where a
registered sex offender may live. l8 Consequently, the Eighth Circuit
implied that restrictions on the right to work or engage in commercial
transactions in the restricted area, as well as expelling sex offenders from
their community, might be tantamount to banishment.
Unlike the Iowa statute, the new Georgia statute as originally written
is precisely the type of statute that the Eighth Circuit would consider to be
banishment. That the statute also prohibits "loitering" (which is ambiguous
as to the behavior it seeks to deter) reinforces that registered sex offenders
are not to be in the restricted areas for any reason. Even if that was not the
intended meaning behind the word "loiter," it is probable that sex offenders
would avoid crossing into these areas for fear that their presence would be
construed as "loitering" and would land them ten to thirty years in prison.
Unlike other residency restriction statutes that have been challenged for
violating the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, the new Georgia
statute so effectively takes registered sex offenders out of communities
with schools, churches, childcare centers, and other areas where minors
congregate, that it can only be considered banishment. Further, there is no
"grandfather" provision under the new Georgia statute, so those who
established
residency prior to the enactment of the law will be forced to
119
move.
In April of 2006, in Doe v. Baker, the District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia reviewed the 2003 Georgia residency restriction statute,
which prohibited registered sex offenders from living within one thousand

115. Id.; IOWA CODE § 692A.2A(4)(c) (2005).
116.
117.

GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a), (b) (2006).
Hobson, supra note 12, at 969.

118. Miller, 405 F.3d at 720.
119. See§42-1-15.
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feet of any school, childcare facility, or area "where minors congregate.
The court also applied the Smith four-factor test. On the question of
whether the statute equated to banishment, and therefore punishment, the
court in Baker expanded on both Smith and Miller, positing that "[a] more
restrictive act that would in effect make it impossible for a registered sex
offender to live in the community would in all likelihood constitute
banishment which would result in an ex post facto problem if applied
12
retroactivelyto those convicted prior to its passage.' '
The new Georgia law is more restrictive than the 2003 law. The new
law prohibits not only where one may live, but additionally, where one may
work or loiter.
The practical consequences of the new statute are
striking. First, the prohibited areas have been expanded to include
churches, parks, and school bus stops, among other places minors may
congregate. Thus, it is questionable whether a registered sex offender may
even attend mass at church, prayer services, weddings, or funerals for fear
of being found to be "loitering" in the restricted zone. In terms of
employment, registrants would need to change jobs if their work location is
in the newly restricted zone. Alternatively, they might have to change jobs
because their residence is in a newly restricted zone and it is impracticable
to commute to the same work location. Additionally, the law poses an
interesting question for people whose work takes them to different
locations, including gardeners, delivery people, sales people, and
construction workers. To what extent will they be able to move about the
community without violating the new Georgia statute?
According to the plaintiff sex offenders opposing the law, the practical
23
effect of the statute is to make it impossible to live in the community;
indeed, House Majority Leader Jerry Keen would love nothing more! 124 As
far as what the Georgia district court in Baker said about such a statute
being applied retroactively to people who were convicted before the law
came into effect, this is exactly what the new Georgia law as originally
written does. The Iowa statute did not present this latter problem because
of the exemption that its "grandfather" provision provided. Georgia has no
such provision.12 5 Under the logic of the district court in Baker, the new

120. Doe v. Baker, No. 1:05-CV-2265-TWT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67925, at *2 (N.D. Ga.
April 5, 2006).
121. Id. at *12 (emphasis added).
122. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a), (b) (2006). Note that the working and loitering
provisions are still valid after Mann.
123. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 24-25.
124. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
125.

§ 42-1-15.
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Georgia law would constitute banishment, which is historically regarded as
a form of punishment.
B.

The Georgia Residency Restriction Promotes the Traditional Aims of
Punishment
The second factor under the Smith test is whether the residency
restriction promotes the traditional aims of punishment: deterrence and
retribution. 126 While admitting that the question was a difficult one to
measure, the Eighth Circuit cited the Supreme Court's emphasis in Smith
that Alaska's reporting requirements were "reasonably related to the danger
of recidivism in a way that was consistent with the regulatory objective,"
and therefore did not support the contention that the registration
requirement was punitive (despite the Ninth Circuit finding punishment
where the length of reporting requirements correlated to the degree of the
crime committed
and not to the degree of risk a sex offender posed to
12 7
society).

The restrictions under the new Georgia statute do not necessarily
prevent recidivism. In regards to the relationship between the restriction
imposed by the statute and the danger of recidivism, David Finkelhor, a
University of New Hampshire sociology professor who is Director of the
Crimes Against Children Research Center, explains that "[r]esearch has yet
to show that such buffer zones are effective at reducing sex crimes" and
that "[s]ex offenders typically meet their victims through their jobs,
volunteer groups or other social networks, not because they live in the same
neighborhood."1 28 Georgia's residency restriction as originally written will
not necessarily reduce an appreciable number of sexual offenses against
children. Thus, the correlation between the imposed restriction imposed by
the statute and the danger of recidivism is weaker than that in the
regulatory objective and registration requirement in Smith.
The new Georgia statute promotes the traditional aims of punishment.
The harsh effects of being virtually banished from the community would
serve as a great deterrent129 against committing a sex offense because it
helps to discourage anyone considering committing a sex offense from

126. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 720 (8th Cir. 2005).
127. Miller, 405 F.3d at 720 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 102) (internal quotations omitted).
128. Greg Bluestein, Georgia's Tough Sex-offender Law Set to Launch, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
June 23, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/23
/AR2006062300899_pf.html [hereinafter Set to Launch].
129. Black's Law Dictionary defines "deterrence" as "[tihe act or process of discouraging
certain behavior, particularly by fear; esp., as a goal of criminal law, the prevention of criminal
behavior by fear of punishment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 187 (Pocket ed. 1996).
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doing so. The statute theoretically has an incapacitating 3 ° effect because
its purpose is to remove sex offenders from places where there are likely to
be children, thus attempting to remove the temptation and opportunity to
commit the crime. Lastly, the statute also serves a denunciating' 31 purpose.
By expelling the registrants from their communities, the statute condemns
the offense and conveys society's disproval of the offender's conduct.
Thus, the new Georgia statute promotes traditional aims of punishment.
C. The Georgia Residency Restriction Subjects Registered Sex Offenders
to an Affirmative Disability or Restraint
The third prong of the Smith test is whether the new Georgia statute
132
subjects registered sex offenders to an affirmative disability or restraint.
A restraint may be defined as a "[c]onfinement, abridgement, or
limitation."' 33 If the statute imposes a "minor and indirect" 1restraint
or
34
disability, a court will unlikely find there to be a punitive effect.
In Smith, the Supreme Court found that the registration system was
not an affirmative restraint similar to probation or supervised release where
"offenders subject to the Alaska statute are free to move where they wish
and to live and work as other citizens, with no supervision. '131 In Miller,
the Eighth Circuit conceded that, unlike Alaska's registration requirement,
the Iowa residency restriction imposes "an element of affirmative disability
or restraint" based on the fact that some sex offenders are restricted from
living in areas where they lived with their parents or spouses. 136 However,
the court also noted that the residency restriction is not as disabling or
restraining as the involuntary civil commitment scheme in Kansas v.
Hendricks.137 The court emphasized that the third factor is not dispositive,
but should
be reviewed in conjunction with the fourth factor, legislative
38
1
purpose.
Even though the courts apply the same test to both residency
restrictions and registration requirements, residency restrictions impose a
130. "Incapacitation" is defined as "[tlhe action of disabling or depriving of legal capacity."
Id. at 303.
131. To "denounce" is defined as "[t]o condemn openly, esp. publicly," "[t]o declare (an act
or thing) to be a crime and prescribe a punishment for it," or "[t]o accuse or inform against." Id.
at 181.
132. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003).
133. Duster, supra note 88, at 731 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1340 (8th ed. 2004)).
134. Id. (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 100).

135. Smith, 538 U.S. at 101.
136.

Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721 (8th Cir. 2005).

137.

Id. (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997)).

138. Id.
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greater restraint on convicted sex offenders than statutes that merely
require registration of personal information. The courts have conceded that
sex offenders who are prohibited from living in specified areas face
39
physical restraints that are not present in mere registration statutes.
140
However, judges disagree on how much weight to give this concession.
The new Georgia statute as originally written is even more disabling
and restraining than the registration statute in Smith and the residency
restriction in Miller. The statute covers more types of locations and
increases the prohibition from only residency to residency, working, and
loitering. 4 1 Even post-Mann, the state legislature will probably write a
new residency provision, so the thrust of these components working
together is a real threat in Georgia. Unlike the mere registration system in
Smith, the Georgia statute deprives a registrant the freedom of deciding
where he may live and work. The plaintiff sex offender class in Georgia
claims that they are being completely pushed out of most of the state and
because many offenders are on parole and cannot just leave the state, many
will be pushed out onto the streets. 142 Certainly the restraint or disability
imposed by this new residency restriction that bans sex offenders from
living in large parts of the state is far greater than the registration imposed
by Alaska's statute.
Iowa's statute allowed for registrants who had already made their
homes in the restrictive areas prior to the law's enactment to remain living
there without violating the statute. 14 3 This shows that the Iowa state
legislature made a conscious decision to mitigate any affirmative disability
resulting from the statute. The new Georgia statute imposes an affirmative
disability or restraint on registered sex offenders.
Both the Smith and Miller courts rejected the argument that the
Alaskan registration statute and the Iowa residency restriction, respectively,
imposed an affirmative disability or restraint where the difficulties were not
as extreme as the involuntary commitment scheme in Hendricks.144 In
Hendricks, the Supreme Court held that the involuntary commitment of a
violent sexual predator pursuant to Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act
did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause where the commitment did not

139. Hobson, supra note 12, at 983.
140. Id.
141. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2006).
142. Complaint, supra note 1, at 24-25.
143. IOWA CODE § 692A.2A(4)(c) (2005). See also Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 705 (8th
Cir. 2005).
144. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103-04 (2003); Miller, 405 F.3d at 720-21.
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constitute punishment or criminalize past conduct.'
The Court did not
find punitive intent where the state legislature "'disavowed any punitive
intent;' limited confinement to a small segment of particularly dangerous
individuals; provided strict procedural safeguards; ... and permitted
immediate release upon a showing that the individual is no longer
146
dangerous or mentally impaired."'
Hendricks is distinguishable from these residency restriction cases.
While the disability or restraint of involuntary commitment is obviously
greater than a residency restriction prohibiting where one may live, work,
or loiter, the class of persons affected by the Kansas statute was more
narrowly tailored. In Hendricks, the statute only applied to those
individuals who, "due to a 'mental abnormality' or a 'personality disorder,'
are likely to engage in 'predatory acts of sexual violence"' after an
individual assessment of risk. 147 Furthermore, the Court considered other
factors in addition to the degree of restraint in determining that the law was
civil regulation and not tantamount to punishment. 148 It is especially
striking that the Kansas statute was based on individual assessment and that
the person, once shown to no longer suffer from the problem, was allowed
immediate release. Georgia's new residency restriction treats all registered
sex offenders as the worst type, -absent any individualized assessment of
risk of recidivism. 49 Further, the residency restriction was indefinite. 5 °
There is no chance to make a showing that a registrant is no longer-or
5!
never was-a threat to the community.1
The courts' use of Hendricks to conclude that a residency or
registration requirement does not impose a large enough affirmative
disability or restraint is unpersuasive. A statute that dictates where one
may live is certainly a restraint. One that also affects where a person may
work, visit, or loiter would affect "an offender's right to contract and
pursue employment by limiting where he may purchase a home, rent an
apartment," and even "inflict additional restraint[s] upon family living
arrangements and relationships.' 52 The restraint in Hendricks may have
been acceptable given the premise of a mental abnormality and individual
risk assessment. Where those considerations are absent, however, the
145.

150.
151.

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 348 (1997).
Id. at 368-69.
Id. at 346.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
Complaint, supra note 1, at 3. See also GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2006).
See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2006).
See id. See also Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-4.

152.

Duster, supra note 88, at 731.

146.
147.
148.
149.
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restraints imposed by the new Georgia sex offender statute should weigh
heavily under this part of the Smith test.
D. Even if the Georgia Residency Restriction Has a Rational Connection
to a Nonpunitive Purpose, the Restriction is Impermissibly Excessive
in Relation to That Purpose
The fourth factor of the Smith test is whether the statute has a "rational
connection to a nonpunitive purpose."' 53 According to the Supreme Court
in Smith, this is the most important factor. 54 Further, the Court explained
that a "statute is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or
perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance."' 55 The Court in
Smith found that the registration requirement had a rational connection to
the non-punitive purpose of preventing recidivism, explaining that "[t]he
excessiveness inquiry of our ex post facto jurisprudence is not an exercise
in determining whether the legislature has made the best choice possible to
address the problem it seeks to remedy. The question is whether the
regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive
objective."'' 56 Thus, the question becomes whether the regulatory means
are reasonable or excessive as they relate to the non-punitive objective.
In Miller, the Eighth Circuit found that the residency restriction statute
had a rational connection to the non-punitive purpose of protecting the
public. 57 The Eighth Circuit then deferred to the wisdom of the state
legislature, and rejected the contention that the restriction was
excessive
58
without lending any guidance as to what would be excessive.
Circuit Judge Melloy, in his dissent regarding the ex post facto
challenge, disagreed with how the majority applied the Smith test to the
facts. 159 While he agreed with the majority that the statute did bear a
rational connection to a non-punitive legislative purpose, he believed that
the statute was excessive.160 Judge Melloy reasoned that "the severity of
[the] residency restriction, the fact that it is applied to all offenders
identically, and the fact that it will be enforced for the rest of the offenders'
lives, makes the residency restriction excessive."' 6' After analyzing the

153.

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003).

154. Id.
155.

Id. at 103.

156.
157.

Id. at 105.
Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721-23 (8th Cir. 2005).

158.

Miller, 405 F.3d at 721-23.

159. Id. at 723.
160. Id. at 725.

161. Id. at 726.
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other factors of the test, Judge Melloy ultimately concluded that "only one
[factor] weigh[ed] in favor of finding the statute nonpunitive," that the
residency restriction was punitive, and that the Iowa statute "is an
to persons who
unconstitutional ex post facto law that cannot be applied
162
committed their offenses before the law was enacted."
More recently, the Eighth Circuit upheld the validity of an Arkansas
residency restriction in Weems v. Little Rock Police Department.,63 The
registration act in question required registration and prohibited high level
sex offenders from living within two thousand feet of a school or daycare
center. 164 In discussing whether or not the restriction was excessive, the
court considered that the statute was only aimed at "high risk offenders"
and "sexually violent predators," determined through a particularized risk
assessment, and that the sex offenders were allowed to challenge the
findings of the assessment. 165 The statute also exempted those high-level
sex offenders who lived in and occupied the property before the enactment
of the statute. 166 The Eighth Circuit decided that, because of the detailed
risk assessment, the law was not excessive in relation to the legislative
purpose of protecting the67 public from those sex offenders most likely to
commit repeat offenses. 1
In evaluating whether or not the 2003 Georgia statute that restricted
mere residency was excessive in relation to its purpose, the Eleventh
Circuit accepted that the fact that "some sex offenders will be forced to
move from their current homes" was a reasonable consequence of the
statute and consistent with its purpose. 168 In regards to those who had
established residency before the enactment of the statute, the court
reasoned that allowing an exemption would defeat the purpose of the
statute.169 Because the plaintiffs lacked standing, the court declined to
or
consider the constitutionality of the statute as it related to new schools
0
daycare centers built after an offender had established residence.17
162.

Id.

163. Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010, 1010 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that
the residency restriction applying to the most dangerous sexual predators rationally advanced the
state's legitimate interest in protecting children and violated neither the Due Process, Equal
Protection, or Ex Post Facto clauses, nor the right to intrastate travel).

164. Id.
165. Id. at 1013.

166. Id.
167. Id. at 1017.
168. Doe v. Baker, No. I:05-CV-2265-TWT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67925, at *17 (N.D. Ga.
April 5, 2006) (emphasis added).

169. Id.
170.

Id.
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The new Georgia statute is distinguishable from the Alaskan
registration statute, the residency restrictions in Iowa and Arkansas, and
Georgia's previous residency restriction statute. Georgia's new residency
restriction is more excessive than mere registration, because it dictates
where one may live, work, and loiter.'
Just because there may be a
rational connection between evidence of high recidivism rates among sex
offenders and merely having to register, it does not follow that practically
banishing convicted sex offenders from entire communities within the state
has a rational connection and is not excessive.
The Iowa and Arkansas statutes only applied to one's residency, not to
where one works or visits."' Those statutes also did not apply to those
who had established residency before the enactment of the law or 173
to
schools and daycare centers constructed after the law was enactment.
The Arkansas statute is even more distinguishable from the new Georgia
statute because it only affects those sex offenders found particularly
dangerous after individual assessment, and it creates a procedural method
for a sex offender to challenge the finding. 174 Lastly, Georgia's previous
law only affected residency and had fewer enumerated prohibited
locations. 175 The new Georgia statute as originally written is more
excessive than any others held valid in the country. Beyond establishing
where sex offenders may not live, it also prohibits where they may work
and loiter.' 76 Unlike the Iowa statute where registrants can still visit areas
in which they are not allowed to live, 177 the Georgia statute expels sex
offenders from these restricted areas altogether.
Judge Melloy made the argument in his dissent in Miller that "the
severity of [the] residency restriction, the fact that it is applied to all
offenders identically, and the fact that it will be enforced for the rest of the
offenders' lives, makes the residency restriction excessive."' 178 His dissent
is more realistic, reasonable, and lends more guidance than the majority's
opinion. It should be adopted here. This statute is more excessive than any
other. The legislative purpose to protect the public is a worthy one, and
courts will not judge the wisdom of the statute, but merely look to find a

171.
172.
173.
174.
the risk
175.

GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2006).
IOWA CODE § 692A.2A (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (2006).
IOWA CODE § 692A.2A(4)(c); § 5-14-128(b), (c) (2005).
Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010, 1012-14 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining
assessment and administrative review in relation to the residency restriction).
Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-13 (2006) with GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2006).

176.

§ 42-1-15.

177.
178.

Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 713 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 726.
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rational connection between the statute and a nonpunitive purpose. 7 9
However, here, where thousands of sex offenders at every level of offense
are effectively being banished from their communities,180 the restriction is
excessive in relation to the purpose. It would be hard to imagine what the
courts would deem to be excessive if not this new Georgia statute.
Under the Smith test and subsequent case law, the new Georgia statute
makes a strong case for punishment, specifically where the practical effect
of the statute is to banish convicted sex offenders from the state. Unlike
the other challenges under the Ex Post Facto Clause, this statute is punitive
in nature.
III. Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution declares that "[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted."' 181 Because the Smith, Miller, and Baker
courts found that the sex offender statutes were not punishment, the courts
punishment under the
held that the statutes could not be cruel and unusual
182
there.
inquiry
the
stopped
and
Amendment
Eighth
There is a much stronger argument that the new Georgia statute is
punishment, as determined in the ex post facto analysis above. If the new
Georgia statute is found to be tantamount to punishment, the courts must
then address whether or not such punishment is cruel and unusual in the
context of this more sweeping residency restriction statute.
It is rare for Eighth Amendment challenges to be successful in noncapital punishment cases.' 83 However, the Eighth Amendment prohibition
be implicated where the punishment
on cruel and unusual punishment may
84
is based on an individual's status.'
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of punishment based on
status under the Eighth Amendment. In Robinson v. California, the
appellant alleged an Eighth Amendment violation of cruel and unusual
punishment when he was arrested and prosecuted pursuant to a California
statute for being a drug addict. 85 His guilt was premised on the presence

179. Id. at 721-23.
180. See supra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
181. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
182. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003); Miller, 405 F.3d at 723 n.6; Doe v. Baker, No.
I:05-CV-2265-TWT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67925, at *18 (N.D. Ga. April 5, 2006).
183. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 21 (2003).
184. See infra text accompanying notes 185-98.
185. Robinson v. California,370 U.S. 660, 660 (1962).
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of needle marks on his arms. 186 At the time he was arrested, there was no
evidence that he was under the influence of illegal narcotics, nor did he
have symptoms of withdrawal. 187 He did, however, admit to occasionally
using narcotics. 88 The Supreme Court found that a statute that "makes the
'status' of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender
may be prosecuted" inflicts cruel and unusual punishment on the
defendant. 189 The Court distinguished between the act of using drugs and
the status of being a drug addict; 90 one may be punished for the former,
but not the latter.' 9' The Court explained:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt
to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a
leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease.... [A] law which
made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be
universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment ....We cannot but consider the statute before us as of
the same category. 192

The Supreme Court also took up the issue of status in Powell v.
Texas. 93 The Court upheld a Texas statute prohibiting being intoxicated in
95
public. 94 The appellant was arrested and convicted under the statute.
Invoking Robinson, the appellant claimed he was impermissibly punished
for his status as an alcoholic. 96 The Court distinguished this case from
Robinson, where the appellant was punished "not for being a chronic
97
alcoholic, but for being in public while drunk on a particular occasion."'
The Court reaffirmed Robinson's holding that "criminal penalties may be
inflicted only if the accused has committed some act," and found that the
appellant was not impermissibly punished for his status, but for his
conduct. 198

186. Id. at 661-63.
187. Id.at 662.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 661.
Id.at 666.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 666-67.

193. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
194. Id. at 537.
195. Powell, 392 U.S. 514 at 517.
196. Id. at 532.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 533.
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The new Georgia statute treats every offender on the registry as the
worst type.' 99 Those on the registry have already been punished for their
prior conduct. 200 If the residency restriction is tantamount to punishment
where registrants are effectively banished from their communities absent
any new illegal conduct, then the new Georgia statute punishes registrants
by virtue of their status as sex offenders. Arguably, Robinson's holding is
specific to those who suffer from some sort of involuntary illness. Even if
Robinson's holding were construed this narrowly, many judges accept that
sex offenders need some sort of psychological treatment. 20 ' This may be
taken to mean that at least some sex offenders suffer from an involuntary
illness. Thus, the sex offenders are impermissibly punished by virtue of the
status of having a mental illness, as in Robinson. The problem with
punishment based on status is clear in a situation like this one where a
registered sex offender's status is static. Those registered sex offenders
who are already on the registry do not choose to be on it and cannot
voluntarily come off of it. 20 2 If the residency restriction effectively
banishes these sex offenders, they are being punished for a status over
which they no longer have control-being a registrant. Thus, registered
sex offenders should receive the same status treatment as a drug addict,
leper, or alcoholic. The punishment inflicted by the new Georgia statute is
not only punishment after the fact, but it impermissibly punishes sex
offenders based on their status in violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment.
IV. Procedural Due Process
The new Georgia statute prohibits a registered sex offender from
living, working, or loitering within one thousand feet of a church.20 3 The

199. Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
200. Id. at 2. See also Sledge, supra note 61.
201. Michael P. Griffin & Desiree A. West, Student Article, The Lowest of the Low?
Addressing the Disparity Between Community View, Public Policy, and Treatment Effectiveness
for Sex Offenders, 30 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 143, 150 (2006).
202. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2006). Registered sex offenders must "[c]ontinue to comply
with the registration requirements of this Code section for the entire life of the sexual offender."
§ 42-1-12(0(7). A registered sex offender may petition the court to be released from the
registration requirement if the court finds that the offender does not pose a substantial risk of
recidivism, has been sentenced for punishment for the sexual offense, and ten years have lapsed
since the sex offender's release from prison, parole, supervised release, or probation. § 42-112(g).
203.

GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a), (b) (2006).
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statute defines "church" as a "place of public religious worship. 2 °4
However, "loitering" is not defined meaningfully in the statute.20 5
The ambiguity in the definition of "loitering" is unconstitutionally
vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Supreme Court has recognized that a criminal law may
be invalidated due to vagueness when it "fail[s] to provide the kind of
notice that enables ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits"
or it "authorize[s] and even encourage[s] arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. 2 0 6 If people do not know what behavior is unlawful, they do
not have proper notice and cannot be expected to know how to conform to
the law.20 7
In City of Chicago v. Morales, the city enacted a gang congregation
ordinance that prohibited loitering ° 8 in public places in groups of two or
more where at least one person was a criminal gang member. 2 0' In a
plurality opinion, the Supreme Court held that the ordinance was
impermissibly vague on its face, in part because it did not specify the
prohibited conduct 2 1' and, therefore, did not give adequate notice to
citizens who wished to use public streets. 212
The new Georgia statute prohibits registered sex offenders from
living, working, or loitering within one thousand feet of a church. 1 3 For an
example of the uncertainty regarding "loitering," registrants will not know
from the text of the statute whether their conduct in attending mass,
weddings, funerals, Bible study, or support groups qualifies as "loitering"
in violation of the church provision of the new statute. It is possible that
attending mass is not prohibited, but lingering around the church after mass
to speak with others or to wait for traffic in a crowded parking lot to
disperse may be. Another example would be if a registrant parent were to
pick-up his or her daughter from a school or school bus stop. Would
waiting in the car for the child's arrival constitute loitering? Any
204.
205.
206.

§ 42-1-12(a)(7).
§ 42-1-12.
City ofChicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999).

207. Id.
208. Id. at 45-46. The Supreme Court recognizes that "the freedom to loiter for innocent
purposes is part of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 53.
209. Id. at 45-46.
210. Id. at 51 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.).
211. Id. at 56-57 (finding an impermissibly vague definition where "loitering" was defined in
the ordinance as "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose").
212.
213.

Id. at 60. (Stevens, J., joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.).
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a), (b) (2006).
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reasonable person would not want to risk ten to thirty years in prison in
order to find out exactly what "loitering" means. The registered sex
offenders are not given a clear enough idea in this new statute of what
constitutes illegal "loitering." Thus, they do not have adequate notice of
what prohibited conduct will result in criminal penalties. They will not
know how to conform to the law and, in all likelihood, will steer clear of
prohibited areas, including churches, to avoid the potentially harsh
penalties of the law.
V. Free Exercise Clause Under the First Amendment
The First Amendment prohibits the government from making any laws
"prohibiting the free exercise" of religion.21 4 The new Georgia law
prohibits sex offenders from living, working, or loitering within one
thousand feet of churches.21 5
The Free Exercise Clause is invoked when the government prevents a
person from engaging in conduct required by his or her religion,2 16 when
the government requires conduct that is prohibited by a person's religion,21 7
or when a law makes it more burdensome for an individual to practice his
or her religion. 1 8 The first and third of these situations may be implicated
by the new Georgia statute.
For example, a person's religion may require them to attend mass or
get married at a church. If "loitering" includes the attendance of these
events or being on the premises for some time thereafter, the attendant
would be in violation of the law. This statute might also affect religions
that require proselytizing by their followers. The act of going from house
to house may violate the "loitering" or "work" provisions of the statute and
would require an unreasonable amount of research in determining what
zones in which they may proselytize. The law would arguably make this
latter example more burdensome on members of that religion. The
vagueness of the "loitering" provision would likely deter many from
stepping within one thousand feet of a church, thus burdening the practice
of one's religion.
214. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
215. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a), (b) (2006).
216. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding the constitutionality of a
law forbidding polygamy despite claim that it was required by Mormon religion).
217. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting argument that providing Social
Security numbers and paying Social Security taxes was prohibited by the Amish religion).
218. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion was violated where the state employment agency
denied unemployment benefits to claimant who terminated his employment due to conflicting
religious beliefs).
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From a policy standpoint, it would seem to be impractical to cut
registered sex offenders off from any means of rehabilitation. Prohibiting
or discouraging sex offenders from participating in a faith-based
community may isolate them from various sources of support that might
otherwise help to rehabilitate them and integrate them into the community
of law-abiding citizens.)' 9 Such rehabilitation might be helpful in
preventing recidivism. 220 Obstructing rehabilitation by taking away the
arguably healthy influence and support of a faith-based community may be
counterproductive to the state's goal of preventing future sex offenses.

VI. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Georgia's statute has been called one of the toughest sex offender
statutes in the country. 221 It is no secret that the Georgia state legislature
hoped to drive convicted sex offenders out of the state of Georgia with the
enactment of the new law.222 When California enacted its three strikes law,
many felons left the state.223 A statute as harsh as Georgia's sex offender
residency restriction might have a similar effect, not only deterring
potential sex offenders from offending, but causing registrants to leave the
state and deterring out-of-state sex offenders from entering Georgia.224
Ironically, with Georgia's living restriction currently invalid and
unenforceable, House Majority Leader Jerry Keen is afraid that as of the
Mann decision, "any convicted sex offender can live anywhere in
Georgia

... with

no restriction .... Florida has a residency requirement.

Koch, supra note 11.
220. See Steven J. Wernick, Note, In Accordance with a Public Outcry: Zoning Out Sex
Offenders Through Residence Restrictions in Florida, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1147, 1188-1189 (2006)
(explaining that residency restrictions can result in higher rates of recidivism where prohibited
areas tend to be located near "areas where sex offenders work, socialize and receive treatment").
219.

221. Robbie Schwartz, Sheriff Looking for Ways to Enforce Law, THE WALTON TRIBUNE,
July 2, 2006, available at http://waltontribune.com/story.lasso?ewcd=b70146b7c7a07714%20
(last%20visited%209/17/07) (last visited Oct. 15, 2007)
222. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
223. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 26-28, 30-31 (2003) (holding that California's
three strikes law was not grossly disproportionate, and therefore, did not violate the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment). The Court noted that after the three strikes
law was implemented, "[m]ore California parolees are now leaving the state than parolees from
other jurisdictions entering California," a "striking turnaround" that began in 1994. Id. at 26-28.
224. See Monica Davey, Iowa 's Residency Rules Drive Sex Offenders Underground, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006 (noting that Iowa's neighboring states have enacted their own residency
restriction laws in order to prevent from becoming a "dumping ground" for Iowa's sex offenders),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/l5/national/5offenders.html(last visited Oct. 15,
2007).
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Alabama has a residency
requirement. Where do you think those people
225
are going to go?
The plaintiffs in the federal class action case claimed that sex
offenders are being forced to leave Georgia.226 The concern is primarily
with the now invalid living restriction. Regardless of whether Georgia's
state legislature succeeds in rewriting a tough living provision, this concern
is relevant to other states that seek to enact such stringent residency
restrictions. The Dormant Commerce Clause may be implicated where a
state statute is, in effect, dumping its convicted sex offenders into
neighboring states and keeping out-of-state sex offenders from entering.
227
Congress has the power to regulate commerce among the states.
Where Congress is silent in a particular area, however, the states are free to
legislate in that area unless the state statute violates "the restraints imposed
by the Commerce Clause itself."228 The scope of these "restraints" is not
defined in the Commerce Clause, but through case law. 229 In Baldwin v.
Seelig, Justice Cardozo explained that the Constitution "was framed upon
the theory that the peoples of the several States must sink or swim together,
and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not
division., 230 Thus, a state generally cannot legislate for its own benefit to
the detriment of the other states and the country as a whole.
In Philadelphiav. New Jersey, the Supreme Court invalidated a New
Jersey statute that prohibited other states from bringing most types of waste
within its borders. 23' The Court found that the statute violated the
Commerce Clause 232 by applying the following test set forth in Pike v.
Bruce Church:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
225. JerryKeen, supra note 75.
226. Set to Launch, supra note 128. See also Complaint, supra note 1, at 23-25. It will be
difficult for registrants on parole to immediately leave the state because they need to obtain
permission from their parole officers before leaving Georgia and special arrangements must be
made for their supervision in the new state. Id. at 24-25. The plaintiffs argue, therefore, that
those on parole will instead end up living on the street rather than being forced out of the state.

Id.
227. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. 294 U.S. 511, 523 (holding that preserving the local price structure was an
impermissible reason for excluding out-of-state products).
231. Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 618.
232. Id.
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commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose if found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could
be promoted as well with a lesser
233
impact on interstate activities.
The majority in Philadelphia decided that the crucial issue was
whether or not the New Jersey statute was a "basically protectionist
measure" or whether it could "fairly be viewed as a law directed to
legitimate local concerns," with only "incidental" effects on interstate
234

commerce.

New Jersey claimed that the legislative purpose of the statute was to
protect the environment, rather than the local economy, because the state's
landfills were rapidly filling up, arguing that "the public health, safety, and
welfare require[d] that the treatment of disposal within this State of all
wastes generated outside of the State be prohibited., 235 However, the Court
explained that the legislative intent was not relevant where "the evil of
protectionism can reside in the legislative means as well as the legislative
ends. 236 The Court said that it did not matter whether the statute's purpose
was to "reduce the waste disposal costs of New Jersey residents or to save
remaining open lands from pollution," because the statute discriminated,
both on its face and in effect, against individuals from out-of-state.237 The
Court invalidated the discriminatory statute, and explained that consistently
prohibiting these types of isolationist statutes will benefit New Jersey, and
every other state, in the long run.238
Where the new Georgia statute as originally written dumps its sex
offenders into other states and creates a disincentive to entry by out-ofstaters, it can be argued under the Dormant Commerce Clause that Georgia
is impermissibly adopting an isolationist approach to sex offenders released
from prison.
In Edwards v. California, the Court invalidated a California statute
that made it illegal to knowingly transport a non-resident indigent into the

233.

Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citation omitted).

234. Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624.
235. Id. at 625.
236. Id. at 627.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 629 ("The Commerce Clause will protect New Jersey in the future, just as it
protects her neighbors now, from efforts by one State to isolate itself in the stream of interstate
commerce from a problem shared by all.").
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state.239 California asserted that the increase of migrants coming into the
state caused financial, health, and moral problems for California. 24' The
Court did not comment on the "wisdom, need, or appropriateness" of the
statute, but instead found that California sought to "isolate itself from
difficulties common to all ... [states] by restraining the transportation of
persons and property across its borders., 24' The Court held that the statute
was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.24 2 Like the
majority in Philadelphia, the Court in Edwards found the prohibition
against transporting the non-resident indigents to be "an open invitation to
retaliatory measures" by the other states.24 3
The waste statute in Philadelphia and the new Georgia residency
restriction are not entirely alike. In Philadelphia the statute sought to
prevent out-of-state waste from coming into state landfills. 244 The chief
sponsor of the Georgia statute acknowledges that one of state's purposes is
to make it undesirable, if not impossible, for sex offenders to remain in the
state. 45 One of the practical effects of the statute is that sex offenders
cannot find a place to live legally. 246 The Georgia statute differs from that
in Philadelphia in that it is not prohibiting out-of-state sex offenders from
entering the state to live, work, and loiter wherever they want to. Instead, it
applies to, and affects mostly, in-state sex offenders. Thus, unlike the New
Jersey statute, the Georgia statute is not discriminatory on its face. Nor is
the practical effect of the statute that out-of-state sex offenders cannot live,
work, or loiter wherever they want to in Georgia, while in-state sex
offenders can. It would be as if New Jersey disallowed anyone to dump
trash in its landfills and as a result, New Jersey citizens had to bring their
trash into other states.
Even though the new Georgia statute is non-discriminatory, it seems
protectionist where Georgia seeks to "dump" its sex offenders into other
states and let those other states deal with the problem. Justice Cardozo said
the states must "sink or swim together." 247 If all the states were to retaliate
and enact the same laws, sex offenders would have little choice of where to

239. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941).
240. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 173.
241. Id.
242. Id
243. Id. at 176.
244. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 618-19 (1978).
245. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
246. Complaint, supra note 1, at 2.
247. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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live in the country. Despite the legitimate goal of public safety, 248 like the
indigents in Edwards and the trash in Philadelphia,Georgia seeks to avoid
"a problem shared by all ' 249 states by enacting this unreasonably harsh
residency restriction statute. Thus, the new Georgia statute is protectionist
and might be found to violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. As states
compete to enact the toughest residency restrictions to not only contain, but
to keep sex offenders out of the state, it is increasingly likely that courts
will have to address Dormant Commerce Clause problems posed by
"dumping" these sex offenders into other states.
VII. Other Considerations
Aside from other legal considerations not herein discussed, the new
Georgia statute raises some practical concerns and policy issues for other
states enacting residency restrictions. First, the very purpose of protecting
the public may not be realized through the new Georgia statute. With harsh
restrictions and many offenders who believe there are few places they1
25
250
could live, work, and loiter legally, they may either become homeless
or give fake addresses to law enforcement.252 For example, the Iowa
residency restriction statute "brought unintended and disturbing
consequences," including that "[i]t has rendered some offenders homeless
and left others sleeping in cars or in the cabs of their trucks. 253 Because of
state and local sex offender residency restrictions, sex offenders have been
effectively barred (banished, I would argue) from large parts of cities.254
"They can't live in most of downtown Tulsa, Atlanta or Des Moines, for
example, because of overlapping exclusion zones around schools and day
care centers., 255 In any event, these registered sex offenders will fall under
the radar of law enforcement. Without knowledge of where convicted sex
offenders actually reside, the whole point of the sex offender registration,
let alone residency restrictions, is defeated. This may also give a false
sense of safety to the public if it thinks that law enforcement is keeping

248.
249.

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 629.

250. Koch, supra note 11.
251. Davey, supra note 224 (noting that the Iowa statute "brought unintended and disturbing
consequences," including that "[i]t has rendered some offenders homeless and left others sleeping
in cars or in the cabs of their trucks.").
252.

Koch, supra note 11.

253. Davey, supra note 224.
254. Koch, supra note 11.
255. Id.
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track of these offenders, when it is in fact unable to do SO. 25 6 There is also
concern that the strictness of residency restrictions will cause sex offenders
not to register at all, leading to more unregistered and unmonitored sex
offenders.25 ' As a result, the new statute might even make conditions more
dangerous for children.
Second, the new Georgia statute may prevent rehabilitation, which is
important for both the well being of the sex offender and for public safety.
According to Jill Levenson, professor of human services at Lynn
University, many offenders are more likely to commit additional crimes if
forced into rural areas due to lack of employment and mental health
services-both of which contribute to "needed stability. ' '258 Another factor
that might contribute to stability for sex offenders is church-related
services. The church provision already prevents sex offenders from living,
working, or loitering at churches. 259 As discussed above, religious
communities might help sex offenders to lead lives absent of crime.
However, under the new statute, sex offenders' exposure to the church
community may be severely limited. Further, this church provision as
originally written may affect church halfway houses that are in close
proximity to the church or where residents engage in religious worship.26 °
If sex offenders cannot live near a place of worship and worship takes place
at these church-run halfway houses or the houses are within one thousand
feet of a church, then these church halfway houses are off-limits to those
who may benefit from the housing and counseling services more than noncriminals.
The restrictions in this statute prevent sex offender
rehabilitation. This is not only detrimental to the sex offenders, but to the
public as a whole. The greater the number of unstable sex offenders there
are, the more danger to society.
Another problem with the new Georgia statute is that it is overly broad
for the purpose of protecting children. Aside from failing to distinguish
between the types of sex offense committed,26 1 the statute fails to take into
serious account the relationship between the victim and offender. The
statute removes convicted sex offenders from areas where children are
likely to be with what can only be assumed for the purpose of preventing
sex offenders from preying on children they do not know. This statute is
not written to protect the children of sex offender's neighbors, family
256.

Set to Launch, supra note 128.

257.
258.
259.

Duster, supra note 88, at 773-74.
Koch, supra note 11.
GA. CODEANN. § 42-1-15 (2006).

260. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
261. Jarvie, supra note 43.
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members, or friends. Any protection they receive is incidental. However,
most abused children "suffer at the hands of people they know. ' 2 62 The
typical victim-offender relationship in sexual assaults against children is
vastly ignored. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, approximately ninety-three percent of sexual offenders

against juveniles are family members or acquaintances, while only seven
percent of the offenders are strangers.2 63 Thus, the statute that affects in
excess of ten thousand registered sex offenders 264 casts its net too widely in
proportion to those who actually commit sexual crimes against children
they do not already know.
The school bus stop provision also raises some potential questions for
future enforcement.
Procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that an individual have notice as to what conduct 265
is
muster.
constitutional
pass
to
statute
the
for
statute
a
by
prohibited
There has been litigation as to the meaning of "bus stop" and as of
September 11, 2006, the three counties that have made the most serious
threats to enforce the provision have been temporarily prevented from
doing so by a consent order. 266 The plaintiffs argue that the law would
displace thousands of Georgia's eleven thousand sex offenders.267 Before
the law came into effect, local law enforcement notified registered sex

262.

Koch, supra note 11.

263. HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN
AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS

10 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf.
264. Set to Launch, supra note 128.
265. See supra notes 206-207 and accompanying text.
266. Overview of Whitaker v. Perdue, http://sexoffenderissues.blogspot.com/2007/04/
overview-of-whitaker-v-perdue.html [hereinafter Overview] (last visited Sept. 17, 2007). On
June 29, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in Atlanta issued a temporary
restraining order to prevent the government from enforcing the school bus stop provision of the
statute. Id. On July 25, after a hearing on the issue, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction, finding that the statute defines school bus stops as those "designated by
local school boards of education or by a private school." Id. The court found that no such bus
stop existed in the state of Georgia, so law enforcement could not enforce the provision until such
"designated" school bust stops were in existence. Id. Hours after the court's decision, Columbia
County's school board successfully voted to "designate" the county's bus stops. Greg Bluestein,
School DistrictsNow Face Tough Decision over Sex Offender Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 26,
2006,
http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleasesHB 1059_litigation/NewsArticles/
news_hb1059_ap09.htm. The court once again issued a consent order to prevent the enforcement
of the provision until the constitutional issues could be heard on the merits. Overview. Two
additional counties designated school bus stops and were similarly prevented from doing so. Id.
In order to evaluate the merits of the constitutional claim, this note will presume that the school
bus stop provision is enforced and that most school boards have "designated" their school bus
stops, as Columbia County was able to do within hours of the judgment.
267. Complaint, supra note 1, at 2-4.
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offenders living within one thousand feet of school bus stops that they had
to move in order to avoid criminal penalties.268 Thus, the sex offenders
were initially notified that they were within the prohibited radius of a
school bus stop and needed to move.
Georgia has in excess of ten thousand sex offenders and somewhere
between 150,000 and 290,000 school bus stops. 269 School districts change

school bus stop locations during the school year. 270 Further, school bus
stops generally are not marked. 271 The new law puts "virtually every
residential neighborhood off limits to Georgia's" registered sex
offenders. 272 For example, in Bibb County, where there currently are 4700
school bus stops, 227 of the 230 registered sex offenders would be forced
to move solely based on the school bus stop provision.273 Combine this
with the fact that school bus stops can change throughout the school year,
and some say that this provision could force sex offenders to have to move
repeatedly.2 74
There is no indication that such information will be made available to
registered sex offenders in a timely and meaningful way every time a
school bus stop location changes. If the school bus stop provision is
enforced and there is no way for sex offenders to know in advance that
school bus stop locations are changing, they may lack adequate notice to
move. As a policy matter, it is extremely unreasonable to place this burden
on registered sex offenders. Even if there was some type of website that
they could check on a daily basis to see if locations have changed, this is
not reasonable for them to have to do so. Without advance notice of bus
stop location changes, sex offenders would find themselves in violation of
the statute.
Even if the government or school officials made such information
available, it is unsettling that these registrants might have to move not only
upon such short notice, but also so frequently. For instance, a sex offender
may buy a house or lease an apartment in an unrestricted zone. If a school
bus stop is relocated at some point within the year, if not within the

268. Id. at 9-17.
269. Set to Launch, supra note 128; Greg Bluestein, FederalJudge Weighs Challenge to Sex
Offender Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 11, 2006, http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/
pressreleases/HB 1059_litigation/NewsArticles/news hb 1059_ap06.htm.
270. Set to Launch, supra note 128.
271. See supra note 39.
272. Set to Launch, supra note 128.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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month,275

the sex offender will once again have to move. There is little
incentive for registrants to enter into any long-term commitment for
housing. This might also affect employment. If housing is very difficult to
find, then it is conceivable that one would have to move far away, which
might require a change of employment. This perpetual uncertainty as to
living and working conditions seems like an extreme punishment under
what purports to be a regulatory scheme. If there is not enough notice of
school bus stop location changes, this provision should be struck down as a
violation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

VIII. Conclusion
Given what has become a race between the states to enact the toughest
residency restrictions, it is imperative to take a step back to consider the
constitutionality of such laws and their actual effects. The purpose of this
note is not to champion sexually violent predators or be overly sympathetic
to the plight of the registered sex offender. The goal of protecting children,
and the public at large, is a laudable one indeed. However, Georgia's latest
sex offender statute, as originally written, defies common sense and
common decency where its scope is so broad as to effectively banish
people who were convicted of non-violent offenses, what some might
consider mere improprieties, from the state of Georgia. The residency
restriction is unconstitutional because it constitutes punishment after the
fact, is cruel and unusual punishment, lacks proper notice of the prohibited
conduct and interferes with one's right to exercise his or her religion.
The statute violates: (1) the Ex Post Facto Clause; (2) the Eighth
Amendment; (3) Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth
Amendment; and, (4) the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Despite the Georgia Supreme Court's decision striking down part of the
statute on a Takings Clause theory, these additional constitutional concerns
are still alive and relevant, not only to Georgia, where we will likely see the
state legislature take a second stab at this provision, but to other states that
seek to enact stringent residency restrictions for sex offenders. Georgia's
residency restriction statute also invokes protectionism prohibited by the
Dormant Commerce Clause. Given the other policy considerations
discussed and others not presented in this note, upholding the
constitutionality of laws similar to Georgia's would not only make

275. Visits to the Savannah-Chatham County Public School System website between March
6, 2007 and October 5, 2007 reflect that the school bus route can change on a week-to-week
basis.
Savannah-Chatham
County Public
School System, http://www.savannah.
chatham.kl 2.ga.us/District/Operations/Transportation/2007-08+School+Bus+Schedules.htm (last
visited October 5, 2007).
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ineffectual the text of the specific constitutional clauses, but also would
lessen faith in, and respect for, the law of the state.

